



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

“ Nothing is the mirror, and the
 World the image in it;
 God the shower is, who
 Shows the vision every minute.”

ELLEN M. MITCHELL.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

MIND vs. MATTER.

The conflict between Idealism and Materialism ever and anon breaks out in some new quarter, but the *casus belli* through all the ages remains the same. The riddle of the sphinx was solved in the schools of Greece; the intellectual man is no longer an inexplicable enigma. Berkeley raised an iconoclastic hand against those material forms before which the grossest idolaters, until the present day, have continued to worship. An incestuous alliance with these same materialistic notions has been formed by his professed followers; and modern idealism, like the mythological king of Thebes, is now banished from its own stronghold. Realism has fallen completely into the hands of the materialist; and, in its captivity, too hastily concedes that the Berkeleyan distinctions between mind and matter was a “mere logomachy” — a “metaphysical abstraction.”

Thus the breach which the “ideal bishop” opened is made the butt of ridicule; but whether his distinctions be real or unreal, an impartial history testifies that Berkeleyanism possessed a strength which its strongest antagonists dare not encounter. It was a breach which the extravagant speculations of ideal pantheism could not bridge over; a bottomless pit, which the “corporeal substance” — the rubbish of materialism — has not been able to fill up. “In itself,” as Huxley, in his lecture on the *Physical Basis of Life*, concedes “it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in the terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in the terms of matter;” though this *materialistic* terminology (to reverse his own argument and turn it against him) would be “utterly barren, and lead to nothing but obscurity and confusion of idea,” if, according to the irresistible logic of Berkeleyanism, there is no such thing as “matter.”

To avoid confusion, we must use the terminology of Idealism, and must base all our argument for spiritual existences wholly upon the data furnished by an idealistic system. Physiological facts can be used to prove nothing about a distinct spirituality from the standpoint of a materialistic empiricism; thus, the mind cannot be known as distinct, as other than corporeal substance. The dead Monism of

the materialist allows no *à priori* distinction between the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of matter; mind and matter are one — not in the paradoxical sense of Berkeleyanism, but according to the Huxleyan idea. The riddle of the sphinx has been answered, but the sphinx itself remains, as the representative of the materialistic notion.

The distinction between mind and matter is very vital to the foundation of all theological science. Idealistic realism, the recognized patron of that spirituality which theology demands, is held in durance by materialistic notions of mind and mental phenomena; and its physiological arguments, upon which so much stress has been lately laid, prove nothing unless the (*fallacia petitionis principii*) postulate of mind *vs.* matter is first allowed. It will attempt in vain to convince sceptical gainsayers until it stands wholly outside of an atheistic materialism.

If the synthetic *à priori* judgments of idealism are denied, while those of materialism are accepted, no deductions from physiological data will be irrefragible evidence in support of immaterial or psychical existence. There must be direct inferences from the phenomena of mind, referred to mind itself, supported by an idealistic philosophy, which alone can logically prove these inferences to be valid. Not only will Berkeleyanism accomplish this, but the more powerful system of idealistic realism, if uncorrupted, would possess the strength, without the weakness, of Berkeley's system.

J. E. B.

ROANOKE COLLEGE, SALEM, VA., December 6, 1879.

AHNUNG.

[In the *Phædrus* of Plato, the soul is likened to a chariot drawn by two winged steeds, the one white and the other black. The white horse symbolizes spirit, the black represents the sense. Reason is the charioteer. The embodied soul has reminiscences of its former soarings to the surface of the outer sphere of the sensible universe, where it caught glimpses of the perfect types, or ideas, of all created things.]

Sometimes the tired reason drops the reins —
 The shining reins of the immortal car.
 Then quick as thought the white steed spreads his wings:
 As leaps the lightning through the summer sky,
 So heavenward speeds the ethereal spirit-steed,
 And seems a flash of silver-dust and fire.
 And now is seen the realm of radiant types,
 The perfect patterns of all earthly things.

This is the home of the soul,
 In vision and revery seen;
 Oft through the gates of the morn
 Flashes its diamond sheen.